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"Each generation must reaffirm the guarantee of the First
Amendment with the hard cases." 2
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental tenet of a free society is the right of every citizen to
express himself freely. First Amendment protection of free
speech forms the basis upon which Americans participate in govern-
ment and achieve social change. Just solutions to social problems can
be achieved most effectively through the powerful forces of speech
and counter speech.
American universities educate students not only in areas of substan-
tive import but also, and more fundamentally, by training students to
think and reason independently. The image of rugged individualism
that characterizes American society may have been born in part of a
university education that requires students to challenge their preju-
dices and preconceived ideas. Innovation and new technology come
from challenging existing ways of doing things. Democratic govern-
ment works better when independent-thinking individuals become ac-
tive in lawmaking, and the home of independent, free thought has
traditionally been American academia.
Recently, however, a new threat to education has "cast a pall of
orthodoxy" over university classrooms and campus life.3 Hate speech
codes have been enacted at numerous public and private universities.
These codes strictly limit the kind of speech in which students and
teachers may engage. University administrators and civil rights activ-
ists justify the strict regulation of speech by pointing to the rise in
incidents of racial and sexual harassment on American campuses in
the last decade. The only way that they see to end these acts of bigotry
and hatred is to strictly limit the kinds of speech permitted on a cam-
pus.
The goal of hate speech code advocates is to achieve equality for
traditionally subordinated groups in the marketplace of ideas, thereby
improving the overall quality of life for all citizens. It is the means by
which hate speech code advocates attempt to achieve this end that
conflicts with the First Amendment. Free speech advocates, in oppos-
ing hate speech codes, aim to achieve a similar goal through the use of
counter speech.
2. CLEARY, supra note 1, at 150 (this statement was the opening line of Mr. Cleary's argu-
ment for R.A. V. before the United States Supreme Court on December 4, 1991).
3. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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A number of arguments are put forth by hate speech code advo-
cates to reconcile such codes with the First Amendment.' Speech code
advocates argue that the First Amendment is not absolute and that
hate speech falls outside of its protection. They claim that hate speech
should be classified as "fighting words" and is therefore not worthy
of protection. The United States Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V.
v. City of St. Paul,4 however, forbids the selective prohibition of
fighting words because such codes are both content- and viewpoint-
based restrictions of speech. Contrary to the assertions of speech code
advocates, hate speech codes also do not fall within the secondary ef-
fects doctrine discussed infra, because they are inherently content-
based and therefore fail the content-neutral requirement of the doc-
trine. Furthermore, the codes are not narrowly tailored because less
restrictive means of regulating speech exist.
Moreover, the words and structure of hate speech codes regulate a
vast and indeterminable amount of both protected and unprotected
speech. Students, faculty, and administrators must necessarily guess
as to what speech is permitted and what is prohibited by the codes.
Student political speech may fall within the sweep of the codes al-
though political speech is highly protected by the Constitution. For
these reasons, hate speech codes are overbroad, void for vagueness,
and violate the First Amendment.
When constitutional arguments do not succeed, hate speech code
advocates look to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulating
harassment in the workplace.5 Advocates claim that offensive speech
creates a hostile learning environment for students subjected to hate
speech. But the university setting is different from the workplace.
Workplace speech is generally limited to that which is necessary to get
the job done, and restrictions are permitted on speech that gets in the
way of the job. University education, on the other hand, requires that
students confront and engage in speech that is often offensive and dis-
agreeable. The heart of undergraduate and graduate education takes
place in the context of wide open debate.
Academic freedom requires that the university not only tolerate
hate speech but that it actively support each student's right to speak.
Any limit on the kind of speech a student may engage in will handicap
a university's ability to educate the nation's youth. It is through chal-
lenging and considering disfavored ideas that a person may develop an
independent mind and the opportunity to achieve social change.
4. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991).
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Part II of this Comment reviews the general structure of explicit
and implicit hate speech codes. Part III explores the rationales and
justifications advanced in support of hate speech codes. Part IV ex-
amines the seminal case of R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul6 in light of
campus hate speech codes and discusses the justifications for such
codes. The Comment then applies the doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness to hate speech codes in Part V. Part VI discusses the doc-
trine of academic freedom as positioned against sexual harassment
policies and examines the educational necessity of free speech in
American universities and colleges. Part VII concludes the Comment,
finding that the only way to achieve true civil rights is through the
empowering force of counter speech.
11. THE RISE AND STRUCTURE OF HATE SPEECH CODES
In the last decade there has been an apparent rise in the number of
verbal, physical and political attacks on members of minority groups
in the United States.7 The reason behind the rise in such attacks has
been attributed to a "resurgence of arch-conservative political philos-
ophies naturally hostile to minority groups."' Although there has
been a rise in the number of reported incidents of offensive behavior,
there also has been a proportionate rise itt the expectation of minori-
ties to be "protected" from any potential threat in society.9 These ex-
pectations, coupled with a more vocal populace, may be a parallel
reason for the rise in reported incidents of minorities experiencing of-
fensive behavior. ' 0
Whatever the reason behind the increased incidence of offensive be-
havior, American academia has sometimes responded with a heavy
hand by imposing strict hate speech codes which attempt to mold and
shape student and faculty words and deeds." The general purpose of
6. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
7. William S. Alexander, Regulating Speech on Campus: A Plea for Tolerance, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1349, 1350 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence, Ill, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regu-
lating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990) (reciting a litany of racial incidents
on American campuses); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989) (reviewing the hate speech controversy in the con-
text of numerous hate speech incidents).
8. Jamin B. Raskin, The Great PC Cover Up, 14-Feb. CAL. LAW. 68 (1994) (arguing that
conservatives are hiding behind the First Amendment to justify racist views).
9. This is strictly the observation of the author.
10. Id.
11. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 n.l (E.D. Wis. 1991)
("At least fifteen colleges and universities, including nine state institutions, have adopted or are
considering restrictions on discriminatory hate speech directed at members of historically disad-
vantaged groups."); Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The
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hate speech codes, as explained by proponents, is to ensure equal op-
portunity in education by fostering a learning environment free of
even the most innocuously offensive remark.12 Most hate speech codes
share similar qualities which attempt to address the twin goals of en-
suring equal educational opportunities and protecting potential vic-
tims of hate speech from the psychic injury of offensive words. 3 The
codes require that student and faculty dialogue reflect a heightened
sensitivity to diversity and multiculturalism while curbing discourse
that is less palatable to offended parties. 4
A number of public and private universities have implemented hate
speech codes. 5 Only two of these codes have been challenged in
court.' 6 In each case, a federal district court struck down the codes
based on the First Amendment doctrines of vagueness and over-
breadth. 17 American universities also have seen a rise in what may be
referred to as implicit speech codes. Implicit speech codes limit and
sanction speakers on an ad hoc basis depending on the kind of speech.
After reviewing the structure of explicit speech codes, the next section
of this Comment will briefly review the problem of implicit speech
codes.
A. The Structure of Explicit Hate Speech Codes
Before understanding why hate speech codes run counter to well-
settled First Amendment doctrine, it is important to understand the
structure of such codes. In 1987, the University of Michigan imple-
mented a hate speech code which reached "[elducational and aca-
demic centers, such as classroom buildings, libraries, research
University of California has imposed a hate speech code limiting fighting words similar to that
enacted by the University of Wisconsin. The California code prohibits words that are "likely to
provoke violent reaction whether or not they actually do." Nat Hentoff, FREE SPEEtH FOR ME,
BUT NOT FOR THEE, 161-62 (1992). The New York State University Law School at Buffalo en-
acted a speech code that states "bigotry, prejudice and discrimination are abhorrent to [the]
traditions [of law]. . . . By entering law school, each student's absolute right to liberty of speech
must also become tempered in its exercise, by the responsibility to promote equality and jus-
tice." rd. at 155-56.
12. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name Calling, 17 Harv.C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982).
13. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 854; UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1164; see also, Matsuda, supra
note 7; Delgado, supra note 12.
14. Doe, 721 F. Supp. 852; UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. 1163; Matsuda, supra note 7.
15. "At least fifteen colleges and universities, including nine state institutions, have
adopted or are considering restrictions on discriminatory hate speech directed at members of
historically disadvantaged groups." UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1165 n. 1.
16. Doe, 721 F. Supp. 852; UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. 1163.
17. Doe, 721 F. Supp. 852; UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. 1163.
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laboratories, recreation and study centers .. ."1I Persons were sub-
ject to discipline in these areas for "[any behavior, verbal or physi-
cal, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race,
ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, an-
cestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status
.... ,,19 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
struck down the code on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. 20
Similarly, the University of Wisconsin code stated that the univer-
sity "may discipline a student in non-academic matters in the follow-
ing situations: 2'
(2)(a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other
expressive behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions
at different individuals, or for physical conduct, if such comments,
epithets or other expressive behavior or physical conduct
intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual
or individuals .... .22
The Michigan and Wisconsin codes each contain a section prohibit-
ing students from engaging in speech and behavior that create a "hos-
tile," "intimidating," or "demeaning" learning environment for
others. 21 Ostensibly, this part of each code tracks similar language in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 24 which recognized the hostile work
environment cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 21
Both of the universities set out guidelines for students to describe
the type of speech and behavior that would violate the code. 26 Jokes
18. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856 (discussing University of Michigan Policy on Discrimination
and Discriminatory Harassment).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 852.
21. UWMPost, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165.
22. Id.
23. UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1165 ("The university may discipline a student in non-
academic matters in the following situations . . . [for behavior that intentionally] .... 2. Cre-
ate[s] an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, university-related work,
or other university-authorized activity."); Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856 (A student may be disci-
plined for behavior that "[c]reates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for edu-
cational pursuits, employment or participation in university sponsored extra-curricular
activities.").
24. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
25. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991).
26. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (E.D. Wisc. 1991); Doe
v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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told by one student that demean another on the basis of one of the
selected categories, for example, would violate both codes.27 The Wis-
consin code was crafted in the wake of Doe v. University of Michi-
gan,28 and required that such speech and comments be directed at a
particular individual with an intent to demean the individual-aspects
which were apparently lacking from the Michigan code and lent to
that code's unconstitutionality. 9 The Wisconsin guidelines further
note that a student's comment during a class discussion regarding race
or gender issues would not violate the code. 0 The Michigan code was
struck for penalizing students engaged in similar classroom speech.3
As the structure of each code illustrates, the codes attempt to pro-
tect individuals within specific groups from hearing or otherwise expe-
riencing offensive speech in the academic environment. Less explicit
than written codes, implicit speech codes take the form of sanctions
and reprimands penalizing selected incidents of speech.
B. Implicit Hate Speech Codes
The hate speech codes at the University of Michigan and the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin explicitly proscribe specific types of verbal and
physical behavior based on certain characteristics.32 Generally, explicit
hate speech codes are attempts to limit certain, defined types of
speech. Even though explicit hate speech codes contain vague and ov-
erbroad language, such codes are a far cry from implicit codes which
prescribe speech on an ad hoc basis. Those prosecuted under implicit
hate speech codes are never warned that their speech may result in a
potential lawsuit because such codes have no explicit substance or for-
mat. Implicit codes allow university administrators to selectively pun-
ish speech that is offensive to some on a random basis. Alternatively,
administrators have regulated speech under the guise of sexual harass-
ment policies that regulate conduct. The following discussion reviews
two cases in the context of such implicit speech codes.
Most recently, the U.S. District Court for New Hampshire in Silva
v. University of New Hampshire3 struck the university's sexual ha-
rassment policy on First Amendment grounds.14 The sexual harass-
ment policy stated that:
27. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 858.
28. Id. at 852.
29. 774 F. Supp. at 1165.
30. Id.
31. Doe, 721 F. Supp. 852.
32. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text for a description of the codes.
33. Silva v. University of New Hampshire, 1994 WL 504417 (D.N.H. 1994).
34. Id.
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[a]ll faculty, staff and students have a right to work in an
environment free of discrimination, including freedom from sexual
harassment. It is the policy of the University System of New
Hampshire that no member of the University System community
may sexually harass another. The intent of this policy is not to create
a climate of fear but to foster responsible behavior in a working
environment free of discrimination 5
The policy provides examples of prohibited sexual harassment to in-
clude "derogatory gender-based humor, '3 6 "sexually degrading words
to describe a person," '3 7 and "sexually suggestive objects or pictures in
the workplace." 38 Whether this conduct is intentional or not, it "con-
stitutes sexual harassment and is illegal . . .-"9 The New Hampshire
policy is similarly based on language from Title VII and case law rec-
ognizing a cause of action for a hostile work environment.
In Sigma Chi v. George Mason University,40 the university sanc-
tioned the Sigma Chi fraternity for holding an "ugly woman contest"
beset with racial and sexual overtones .4 The fraternity sued the uni-
versity claiming that the sanctions violated the First Amendment. 42
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the fraternity holding
that the university could not accomplish its goal of an equal educa-
tional environment by regulating speech.43
This case illustrates a possibly more pervasive practice adopted by
many universities to establish and implement formal hate speech
codes. Rather than subjecting a university code to a high degree of
constitutional scrutiny, administrators regulate offensive speech on an
ad hoc basis by sanctioning or reprimanding the guilty speakers. Al-
though formal sanctions against the speaker may result less frequently
than informal sanctions, examples of such reprimands abound and
have the effect of chilling the speech of faculty and students."
35. Id. at * 1.
36. Id. at *2.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. "In an economics class, black students walked out of the room because a foreign stu-
dent kept using the term 'black' instead of African American. The black students and the pro-
fessor objected but the foreign student persisted and so the exodus took place." Hentoff, supra
note 11, at 154. In a separate incident, a business ethics professor was disciplined for stating that
one could be fired for using the term "nigger" in the context of an ethics discussion. Id. at 157.
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This type of ad hoc implicit hate speech code may pose an even
greater danger to speech since the university offers no set of defined
rules prohibiting such speech, but rather selectively enforces sanctions
based on the nature of the speech, the victim, and the speaker. While
the dangers of such content-based restrictions on speech are severe,
speech codes are generally created and enforced with the intent of cur-
ing, or at least curbing, the societal ills of racism and sexism.
III. SPEECH CODES JUSTIFIED
The goals underlying speech codes are manifold: to prevent the psy-
chic injury which results from offensive speech (otherwise known as
the "victim's privilege"), 45 to ensure equal education opportunities for
students likely to be subjected to such speech, and to limit academic
and non-academic discourse to only that speech which has a positive
impact on the search for truth. 6 The following section briefly de-
scribes the premise of these arguments in favor of hate speech codes.
A. The Victim's Privilege,7 or Outsider Jurisprudencea
Outsider jurisprudence proposes that tolerance for offensive speech
is the disguised oppression of minority groups who have traditionally
been excluded from the marketplace of ideas.4 9 The leading proponent
of this perspective, Professor Mari Matsuda, describes offensive, and
specifically racist, speech as a mechanism for the subordination of mi-
norities which reinforces the vertical relationship between the oppres-
sors and their victims.5 0 Professor Matsuda would unilaterally enforce
A law school moot court competition was prohibited from using a problem concerning lesbian
child custody issues. Id. at 204. A constitutional law professor employing the Socratic method
was disciplined for discussing the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against slavery by referring
to blacks in the class as former slaves. Id. at 189-90. The same professor was also reprimanded
for correcting a black student's pronunciation of "the" as "de." The professor also corrected
white students who said "you know" when they spoke. Id. at 192. Examples from Florida in-
clude a constitutional law professor during my time as a student at the Florida State University
College of Law being reprimanded for permitting discussions on the constitutionality of affirma-
tive action programs as part of class instruction. In a similar situation, black law students
walked out of a constitutional law class when a law school professor used rap artists and lyrics as
an example of censorship.
45. Matsuda, supra note 7; Alexander, supra note 7, at 1367.
46. Alexander, supra note 7.
47. Id. at 1367.
48. Matsuda, supra note 7. Outsider jurisprudence is a school of thought rejecting the tra-
ditional 'Eurocentric' descriptions of law and social phenomenon for a revisionist view of law.
Id. "Outsider" replaces the term minority and reflects the feeling of isolation and being an
outsider that minorities experience in the face of hate speech.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2358.
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hate speech codes only against the majority oppressors: whites.,, That
is, a white person who expresses a racial epithet toward a black person
would be subject to the strictest of penalties. However, "[e]xpressions
of hatred, revulsion, and anger directed against historically dominant-
group members by subordinated-group members are not criminalized
.... '52 Professor Matsuda argues that although harm and hurt may
be experienced by the white person, the "degree" of hurt and harm is
different because a black person's attack on a white is "not tied to the
perpetuation of racist vertical relationships, [and] it is not the ...
worst example of hate propaganda."53
A white person offended by such speech is "more likely to have
access to a safe harbor of exclusive [white] interactions. Retreat and
reaffirmation of personhood are more easily attained for [whites]. ' 5 4
Whereas, an "angry, hateful poem by a person from a historically
subjugated group [is interpreted as the] victim's struggle for self-iden-
tity in response to racism."" Thus, the victim's privilege is the ability
to hurl even the most offensive epithet toward any member of the his-
torically dominant race with the assurance that the speech will not be
punished or countered in any way.5"
B. Equal Education Through Unequal Speech
Related to the notion of a victim's privilege of speech is the ideal of
equality. Proponents of this view claim that the stigmatic effect of
racist speech is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.17 The very
nature of racist speech, so the argument goes, "carries an overt denial
of the Fourteenth Amendment's promise and social agenda.""8
51. Id. at 2361.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2361-62
56. Matsuda argues that if history were to change and minority groups were to suddenly
become equal with the oppressing class, there would be no need for this privilege. However,
when the privileged class is the group defining how and when equality is reached and when the
hurt and fear are over, there is an unqualified incentive to maintain the former oppressor's
silence for as long as possible. Furthermore, equality cannot be reached through the subordina-
tion of one group's speech to another group's speech. Equality can be gained through the em-
powerment that comes through counter speech.
57. The relevant portion of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No state shall make or
enforce any law ... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Alexander, supra note 7, at 1370; Lawrence, supra
note 7, at 442-44 (discussing racist speech in the context of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
58. Alexander, supra note 7, at 1370.
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Similar to proponents of the victim's privilege, equality supporters
argue that the state has a duty to not only prohibit racist speech, but
also to act affirmatively as a teacher of social mores and behavior that
contribute positively to the overall societal goal of equality.5 9 There-
fore, to "tolerate an equal speaking to another equal in a way that
denies the dignity and truth of equality is an implicit betrayal of the
whole body politic, hampering positive social evolution. "60 Like advo-
cates of outsider jurisprudence, proponents of this argument believe
that equality may come to minority groups only through the oppres-
sion of majority groups.
C. Truth, Speech, and Non-Speech
The protection of free speech, at its zenith, seeks to discover the
truth through discourse and reason. Proponents of hate speech codes
argue that speech which does not contribute to the uncovering of truth
is not speech at all, and is therefore not entitled to the protection of
the First Amendment. 61 For example, racist or sexist epithets do not
try to inform or convince the listener.62 Such speech does not contrib-
ute to a healthy discourse and dialogue because the offended party has
no opportunity for response or reflection.63 Proponents claim that an
individual yelling racist speech does not intend to "discover truth or
initiate dialogue but to injure the victim."" Under this rationale, be-
fore speech can be protected, "thoughts must be sifted through the
mind's reflective processes before gaining any constitutional legiti-
macy when expressed." 65
These are some of the primary rationales for prohibiting certain
kinds of speech. Despite the good intentions of proponents of hate
speech codes, each of the foregoing arguments conflicts with well-set-
tled First Amendment doctrine. At its core, outsider jurisprudence re-
quires that some speech be limited for the sake of other speech. The
majority's speech must necessarily be limited to ensure that the minor-
ity's message dominates in the marketplace of ideas. Speech codes de-
signed to achieve the victim's privilege suffer because the codes are
content-based restrictions on speech that select a particular viewpoint6
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1371.
61. Id. at 1373; see also UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1174-75 (E.D.
Wis. 1991).
62. 774 F. Supp. at 1174-75.
63. Id. at 1175.
64. Lawrence, supra note 7, at 452.
65. Alexander, supra note 7, at 1373.
66. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2548 (1992).
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as the official government or university message on issues important
in undergraduate and graduate education. That is, such codes prohibit
the racist speech of a white person but allow for the racist speech of a
black person. Thus, speech codes designed to achieve this goal select a
preferred viewpoint and regulate based on that preference.
Similarly, those supporting speech codes for equality's sake would
protect only that speech which promotes the equality of oppressed
groups. For example, the sexist speech of a man to a woman may be
curbed by the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of equal protec-
tion. A woman's sexist speech to a man, however, would go un-
checked because such speech cannot oppress the historically dominant
male. In fact, the argument goes, under the Fourteenth Amendment
the state must act affirmatively to ensure equality through the regula-
tion of the man's speech. 67
Speech codes designed to achieve these goals are content and view-
point selective. Each selects a preferred view and limits speech that is
counter to that view. Well-settled First Amendment doctrine holds
that these codes are "presumptively invalid" because the very pur-
pose of the First Amendment is to protect speech that we disfavor the
most. 69 Although the need for equality in all segments of society is of
great importance, the need to enhance an individual's education
through the introduction of new, and sometimes offensive, ideas is at
least equally important. The fallacy of the speech code arguments is
the assertion that equality and an end to oppression will be achieved
through unilateral speech regulation. 70 Instead, the answer to the scur-
rilous problems of bigotry and hatred must be more speech and better
speech. The force of speech and counter speech in the push for social
change cannot be underestimated, and the university is the primary
place in which students learn the value and power of speech.
Leaders in the speech code movement have attempted to limit the
scope of codes to prescribe "fighting words" only; fighting words are
those words that provoke an immediate injury and violent reaction.7'
Professor Matsuda and others who consider hate speech as non-
speech believe that the "psychic injury" that results from hate speech
67. Alexander, supra note 7, at 1370. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983).
68. 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
69. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
70. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) ("If there be
minority groups who hail this holding as their victory, they might consider the possible relevancy
of this ancient remark: 'Another such victory and I am undone."').
71. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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meets the definition of fighting words and is therefore not entitled to
First Amendment protection.
The constitutional problem with this interpretation is two-fold.
First, speech codes prescribe only certain fighting words (e.g., racist
speech) while other fighting words are acceptable (e.g., aspersions
against an individual's mother). As the next section will illustrate, this
type of selectivity flies in the face of the First Amendment. Beyond
the constitutional problem is a concern regarding the message sent to
university students learning under a speech code. Instead of learning
how to think and reason independently, students are taught that the
act of questioning should be punished because questions regarding the
validity of minority arguments fall within the scope of hate speech
codes. A university education then becomes indoctrination rather than
development of the mind to challenge what is and to discover what
ought to be. A second, and related, problem with speech codes limited
to fighting words is that they are facially overbroad. While fighting
words are not protected, offensive speech is highly protected and, at
least in the case of offensive political speech, is one of the reasons for
the existence of the First Amendment.7 2 Hate speech codes regulate
both protected and unprotected speech. Lastly, proponents of speech
codes argue that the special, captive setting of the university requires
that speech be limited for individuals to learn in an environment free
of fear and hateful speech.
When the foregoing arguments fail as a valid constitutional ration-
ale for speech codes, hate speech code proponents look to Title VII
for protection. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 recognizes a
cause of action for employees against employers for the creation of
what they consider to be a hostile work environment.73
The university, however, differs significantly from the workplace
because the primary role of an undergraduate or graduate education is
to challenge an individual's beliefs and thought processes through the
introduction of new, and sometimes offensive, ideas. Where work-
place speech might be limited to that which is necessary to get the job
done, university speech between and among students and teachers
must be, out of necessity, wide open to all forms of debate-offensive
and polite. Only through the open discussion of ideas and beliefs may
education take place. The doctrine of academic freedom ensures that
72. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949).
73. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11 (1991).
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university speech is free of unconstitutional speech limits which hinder
the achievement of legitimate pedagogical concerns.
The rest of this Comment explores the constitutional bases for re-
jecting hate speech codes on university campuses. Although much has
been written on the issue of hate speech codes in the university con-
text,7 4 few if any commentators have attempted to tackle this issue in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court's majority opinion in R.A. V. v. City
of St. Paul.75 Additionally, the amorphous doctrine of academic free-
dom has proven difficult to understand and apply in hate speech
cases. The next section analyzes content-based restrictions of speech in
light of the R.A. V. majority decision, and continues by examining the
decision's potential effect on future hate speech codes. This Comment
also develops more fully the academic freedom doctrine to conclude
that hate speech codes and education are incompatible means of at-
taining social goals; for it is only through speech and counter speech
that individuals may attain equality in society.
IV. CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
The First Amendment prevents a state from prohibiting speech sim-
ply because of its message.7 6 The above arguments indicate that the
purpose of hate speech codes on university campuses is to shield cer-
tain students and classes of students from speech that they might find
offensive. Yet, the U. S. Supreme Court has never tolerated this type
of purpose.7 7 In fact, if speech is offensive to some, "that conse-
quence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.""8
74. Alexander, supra note 7; Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Fighting Back: Offensive Speech
and Cultural Conflict, 46 SMU L. REV. 145 (1992); Delgado, supra note 12; Lawrence, supra
note 7; Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing
Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NoTRE DAMtE L. REV. 673 (1993); Matsuda, supra
note 7; Carolyn M. Mitchell, The Political Correctness Doctrine: Redefining Speech on College
Campuses, 13 WHnTTnER L. REV. 805 (1992); James A. Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to
the Regulation of Campus Hate Speech, 38 Wayne L. Rev. 163 (1991).
75. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); see Frederick M. Lawrence, supra note 74 (providing a cursory
review of the R.A. V decision); Bloom, supra note 70 (brief discussion of R.A. V. in a review of
general First Amendment doctrine).
76. 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
77. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (noting that freedom of speech encom-
passes the freedom to express ideas which are "defiant or contemptuous"); NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) ("Speech does not lose its protected character
... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action." (emphasis added));
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ("[lIt is a central tenet of the First
Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.").
78. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 548 n.8 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring), rev'd sub nora. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Sery.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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A. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 79
In 1990, R.A.V., a minor, and other teenagers, assembled and ig-
nited a crudely made cross in the yard of a black family. 0 R.A.V. was
charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.8' The
relevant portion of the ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.8 2
The trial court dismissed the case because it found that the statute
was facially overbroad and constituted a content-based restriction in
violation of the First Amendment.83 The Supreme Court of Minnesota
reversed the trial court's decision. 84 The court determined that the
statute did not suffer from overbreadth because prior Minnesota cases
limited the ordinance's reach to restricting only "fighting words"
which do not receive constitutional protection under Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire.8 The Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that
the statute "was not impermissibly content-based [because] . . . 'the
ordinance [was] a narrowly tailored means toward accomplishing the
compelling governmental interest in protecting the community against
bias-motivated threats to public safety and order."" The U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed.87
The majority opinion in R.A. V., written by Justice Scalia, 8 dis-
missed R.A.V.'s overbreadth argument and turned directly to the con-
tent-based argument.8 9 The majority accepted the Minnesota court's
interpretation of the ordinance to limit its reach to fighting words but
nevertheless concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional be-
79. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). See CLEARY, supra note 1.
80. 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
81. St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990).
82. 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
86. Id. at 2541-42 (quoting In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)).
87. Id. at 2550.
88. Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., was joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas, JJ. White, J., concurred in the judgment joined by Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ.).
89. Id. at 2542.
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cause "it prohibit[ed] otherwise permissible speech solely on the basis
of the subjects the speech addresses."90
At the outset, the Court stated that the First Amendment prohibits
the state from proscribing speech or expressive conduct because it dis-
agrees with the thoughts and ideas expressed. 9' For this reason, con-
tent-based restrictions on speech are "presumptively invalid." 92 The
First Amendment, however, is not absolute and the Court has recog-
nized the valid proscription of speech in areas that are "of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."' 93 This limited categorical approach in the proscription of
speech extends to fighting words,9 defamation, 95 and obscenity.9
Throughout First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has sug-
gested that speech in these categories is not constitutionally protected
because of its low social value. 97 However, these categories should not
be viewed as "entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may
be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their dis-
tinctively proscribable content." 98 By way of illustration, the govern-
ment may prohibit libel in general, but may not prohibit only libel
that is critical of the government. 99 Therefore, although fighting
words are generally thought to be of de minimis value in the expres-
sion of ideas, fighting words still retain some value in the exposition
of ideas-just not an essential value.0
The Court has long recognized that some speech may be prohibited
on one basis (e.g., defamation) "but not on . . . another (e.g., oppo-
sition to the city government). . .. "101
[on-verbal expressive activity [may] be banned because of the
action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses-so that
burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires
could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an
ordinance against dishonoring the flag is not. 102
90. Id.
91. id.
92. Id.
93. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
94. Id. at 573.
95. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
96. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
97. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1957); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
98. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2544.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989)).
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The First Amendment also allows for the regulation of the time,
place and manner of speech as long as the regulation is "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech." 103 The state
may also regulate one element of speech (e.g., obscenity) but not "on
the basis of other content elements" (e.g., opposition to the state).1 4
To make the point, Justice Scalia separates fighting words into
"speech" and "non-speech" elements; the former protected, the lat-
ter, unprotected.105 The unprotected, non-speech, aspect of fighting
words may be analogized to a noisy sound truck.106 The sound truck
and the fighting words are both modes of speech, 1°7 in that each can
be used to convey an idea, but, alone, neither has a claim to First
Amendment protection.101 However, in the case of the sound truck
and the fighting words: "[tihe government may not regulate use based
on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message ex-
pressed."'19 Thus, the state's ability to proscribe such speech may not
be used as a vehicle for content discrimination; rather, the state may
simply proscribe the entire category of fighting words without refer-
ence to the kind of fighting words proscribed." 0
The R.A. V. majority next addresses the issue of certain special ex-
ceptions to the general rule against laws which proscribe speech on the
basis of content."' The primary evil associated with content discrimi-
nation is that it necessarily allows the government to exclude certain
viewpoints from the marketplace of ideas." 2 But, in the case of ob-
scenity, defamation and fighting words, when content discrimination
is based on "the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is pros-
cribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination ex-
ists."",
103. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
104. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2544 (1992) (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 2545.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The majority recites several examples in which the government may proscribe an
entire category of speech, such as obscenity, threats to the President, and commercial speech in
industries at risk of fraud. But the government may not criminalize only subcategories of this
kind of speech, such as obscenity with political messages, threats to the President based on the
policy on aid to inner cities, etc. Id. at 2546.
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Another exception to the general rule against content-based statutes
is the secondary effects doctrine.'14 This doctrine, set forth by the Su-
preme Court in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,"' allows the
government to carve out a subcategory of a proscribable class of
speech when such subcategory is associated with "secondary effects"
or harmful consequences directly attributable to the speech."6 As long
as regulation of the secondary effect is "justified without reference to
the content of the ... speech" the state may prohibit the subcategory
of speech to address a secondary effect."' Under this doctrine, then, a
state could allow live obscene performances, but could prohibit those
performances involving minors.'
In a related context, speech and words may often violate laws di-
rected not at speech but at conduct."19 For example, words are used to
violate the law against treason. 2° The proscription of treason is per-
missible since there is no reference to the words spoken.12' Therefore,
a specific "content-based subcategory of . . . speech [may] be swept
up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct,
rather than speech. ' 1 22 In the case of fighting words, sexually deroga-
tory fighting words may violate Title VII's general prohibition against
harassment in employment practices.123 Title VII explicitly proscribes
the use of "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" in creating
a hostile work environment, and thus only incidentally proscribes a
subcategory of proscribable speech. 2" It is important to note that
these exceptions do not depend on the government's agreement with
what a speaker may say. 2 The R.A. V. majority states that such selec-
tivity may be validated even when a neutral regulatory position is
lacking. 26 The cardinal requirement, however, is that "the nature of
the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility
that [the] suppression of ideas is afoot."' 27 The Supreme Court is pri-
114. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
115. Id.
116. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546 citing Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 48).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994); see also Meritor Savings v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986).
125. R.A. V., 112S. Ct. at 2547.
126. Id. The majority does not provide any example of such a regulation, however.
127. Id.
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marily concerned with prohibiting the government from using con-
tent-based regulations for the suppression of certain viewpoints.'28
Applying this rationale to the St. Paul ordinance, the majority de-
termined that despite the limiting construction of the ordinance to
proscribe fighting words only, the ordinance restricted certain fighting
words that arouse "anger, alarm or resentment . . on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender ... .*"29 In effect, the statute
allowed the city to place special restrictions on those who expressed
ideas on disfavored subjects. 30 Under the First Amendment, however,
the city did not have the "authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queens-
bury Rules."''
The state has an interest, and an obligation, to confront bias-moti-
vated messages and notions of racial supremacy. 32 However, the state
may not accomplish this objective by selectively limiting speech.'33 In-
deed, even when the object of such content-based restrictions is to
eliminate certain emotional and psychological "injuries" that result
from messages of group-hatred, the ordinance still fails on First
Amendment grounds. 3 4 The only type of injury attributable to fight-
ing words that may permissibly be proscribed through the First
Amendment is that which is equivalent to a personal and immediate
threat.' 35 Any attempt to distinguish between the injury inflicted by
fighting words "that communicate messages of racial, gender, or re-
ligious intolerance" and other kinds of "psychological" injuries is
128. The Court provided as an example of viewpoint discrimination prohibited by the First
Amendment a case in which a person "could hold up a sign saying ... that all 'anti-Catholic
bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all 'papists' are, for that would insult and provoke violence
'on the basis of religion."' Id. at 2548. While there may be exceptions to the general rule against
content-based statutes, it is fair to say that there are no exceptions for statutes that select one
viewpoint over another.
129. Id. at 2547 (emphasis added).
130. id.
131. Id. at 2548. Marquis of Queenshury Rules are a code of rules governing boxing
matches, named after the Eighth Marquis of Queensbury, Sir John Sholto Douglas, who super-
vised the code's formulation by English athlete John G. Chambers in 1867. WESTER's TI'uRD
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1384 (1986).
132. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
133. Id. St. Paul argued that content-specific limitations are necessary to communicate to the
minority that the majority does not hold these views. The Court responded by stating that the
point of the First Amendment is that the majority's preferences must be expressed by some
means "other than silencing speech on the basis of its content." Id.
134. Id. at 2548. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating that psychological
damage to a person is not the kind of secondary effect permissible to justify the proscription of
speech since such an 'injury' is a primary effect).
135. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548-49. There must be an immediate perception of physical
threat resulting from such fighting words.
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nothing more than "word play. 113 6 The symbols and words singled
out by the St. Paul ordinance evoke "anger, alarm or resentment"
that is "caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive mes-
sage."'137
The St. Paul ordinance did not just single out a particular mode of
expression (e.g., all threatening words), it attempted to single out only
expressions that the city deemed to "communicate messages of racial,
gender or religious intolerance."138 This kind of selectivity allowed the
city "to handicap the expression of particular ideas."' 13 9 For this rea-
son alone, the statute was "presumptively invalid."140 The city argued
that the statute did not target freedom of expression, but rather, it
protected against the victimization of vulnerable citizens.41 By the ci-
ty's determination, the primary effect of the statute was to protect the
citizens.1 42 The majority, however found that the St. Paul ordinance
did not fit the "secondary effects" exception described in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 143 because the "emotive impact of
speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect.'""4"
Arguing in favor of the ordinance, St. Paul asserted that even if the
regulation limited hostile expression, it was justified because it was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.145 "Specifically,
• . . the ordinance help[ed] to ensure the basic human rights of mem-
bers of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimina-
tion ...... ,"14 The Court, however, found that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored to serve the state interest. 147 While the city's stated
interest was compelling, it could employ the weapon of content-speci-
ficity only when no other regulatory alternative existed. 48 To pass
constitutional muster, an ordinance must limit fighting words in gen-
eral, not some fighting words in particular.49 Because the content-
neutral alternative of limiting all fighting words existed, St. Paul's or-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2548.
138. Id. at 2549.
139. Id.
140. Id. In addition, the city's comments and concessions as to the purpose of this selectivity
requires that the ordinance be found invalid. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
144. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1992) (quoting Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2549-50.
149. Id. at 2548-50.
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dinance unduly limited free speech.5 0 The only interest served by the
selective St. Paul ordinance was "that of displaying the city council's
special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out." 15'
B. Applying R.A. V. 's Analysis to University Hate Speech Codes'
Like the St. Paul ordinance in R.A. V., campus hate speech codes
unnecessarily and impermissibly proscribe speech based on content. 15 3
Campus hate speech codes single out certain kinds of speech and view-
points for regulation while affording full protection to other speech.
"[This] is precisely what the First Amendment forbids."'15 4 The fol-
lowing section analyzes the justifications for campus hate speech
codes in the context of R.A. V. 's majority opinion.
1. Fighting Words as Non-Speech
While fighting words have commonly been referred to as "non-
speech" elements of discourse, 5  proponents of hate speech codes
would rid academic discourse of all speech that does not contribute
positively to the search for truth. 15 6 The primary mechanism used in
speech codes to limit hate speech is to expressly prohibit only certain
kinds of words that offend specific classes of individuals.' Even if
these codes target only "fighting words," ' speech codes utilizing this
mechanism fail under R.A. V.'s majority analysis of the fighting
words doctrine.
Before R.A. V., the vitality of the fighting words doctrine was in
question. 159 The R.A. V. majority, however, not only breathed new life
into this permissible proscription of speech, but also further clarified
150. Id.
151. Id. at2550.
152. CLEARY, supra note 1, at 69 (stating that when he was researching the R.A. V. petition
for certiorari, his "focus ... changed from traditional First Amendment case law to the debate
over the repressive climate of a political-acceptability standard prevalent on [American] cam-
pus[es]").
153. Id.
154. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992).
155. Alexander, supra note 7, at 1372. Proponents of hate speech codes sometimes classify
hate speech as "non-speech" because hate speech does not serve the underlying purposes of the
First Amendment of pursuing truth and promoting self-worth through the exercise of each indi-
vidual's capacities. Because hate speech is designed to cause a reaction and not a two-sided con-
versation, it cannot be a valued part of the First Amendment. Id. Thus, hate speech cannot be
speech since only "valued" speech should be protected under the First Amendment. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1373.
158. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
159. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUrONAL LAW 1073-74 12th ed. (1991); Stephen W.
Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 Wash. U. L.Q. 531 (1980).
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its limits. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,'"0 fighting words were
described as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace." '' 6' In Gooding v. Wil-
son, 62 the Court expressly declined to include within the definition of
fighting words those words which convey disgrace and are insulting to
listeners.'16 The Court stated that such a definition would make it a
violation of law to "speak words offensive to some who hear them,
and so sweeps too broadly."' 64 The hate speech codes outlined in Part
II of the Comment all limit speech that "demeans," "insults," "stig-
matizes," or "victimizes" certain classes of individuals. 65 The R.A. V.
majority expressly rejected the St. Paul ordinance because it selec-
tively proscribed such words. 166
The hate speech codes in Michigan and Wisconsin do not target in-
juries resulting from physical force, but rather attempt to protect
against the emotional injury of offensive speech. 67 This injury, pro-
ponents of speech codes argue, makes such words "fighting"
words.'" The codes, however, expressly proscribe only those fighting
words which injure certain individuals on the basis of.certain charac-
teristics. Fighting words which "do not themselves invoke race, color,
creed, religion, or gender- aspersions upon a person's mother, for
example-would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of
those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc. tolerance and equality, but
could not be used by that speaker's opponents."' 69 Professor Matsu-
da's argument in favor of a "victim's" speech privilege, then, runs
counter to the majority opinion in R.A. V..7 0 It is precisely because
160. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
161. Id. at 572; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982)
(Holding that as long as advocacy does not "incite lawless actions [it] must be regarded as pro-
tected speech"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the
public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the
power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious. Equally obvious is that [the] state
may not unduly suppress free communication of views ... under the guise of conserv-
ing desirable conditions.
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308.
162. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
163. Id. at 525.
164. Id. at 527 (citation omitted).
165. See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
166. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
167. See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1175 (E.D. Wis.
1991); Delgado, supra note 12, at 133-49.
168. Lawrence, supra note 7, at 449-57.
169. R.A.V., 112S. Ct. at2548.
170. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text for Professor Matsuda's argument.
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hate speech codes are content and viewpoint selective, that each is a
facial violation of the First Amendment.
2. Secondary Effects
Similarly, the secondary effects doctrine promulgated in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.," ' is often used as a justification
for campus hate speech codes and other content-based proscriptions
of speech. As described in section IV.A above, the doctrine allows
government to carve out a subcategory of proscribable speech when
the speech is associated with harmful consequences to a particular
group. 72 Proponents argue that the codes do not target expressive be-
havior directly; rather, such codes target the conduct and injuries that
come from hate speech. 73 Proponents claim that speech codes are jus-
tified under the secondary effects doctrine because society experiences
severe harm when individuals scream epithets at one another.' 74 Al-
though immediate violence may result, the greatest harm is to the psy-
che of the subordinated class and its individual members.' 7' University
hate speech codes are aimed at protecting members of minority classes
from the "psychic" wounds which result from such demeaning
words. 76 This "secondary harm" of offensive speech justifies the
codes under the Renton doctrine.
On its face, this doctrine allows for the regulation of speech as long
as the regulation cures some secondary harm. 7 7 The regulation, how-
ever, must not regulate speech based on its content. 78 In Renton, the
Court held that a city could regulate the location of obscene movie
theaters to avoid the secondary harm of crime.' 79 In Boos v. Barry,80
the Court clarified this doctrine by stating that a city's attempt to pre-
vent the "psychological damage" of individuals exposed to certain
kinds of speech was not the type of secondary effect contemplated in
Renton.'8' The Court stated that regulation aimed at preventing psy-
chological damage "targets the direct impact of a ... category of
171. 475 U.S. 41(1986).
172. R.A. V., 1!2 S. Ct. at 2546 (citing Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 48).
173. See supra notes 7, 12.
174. Delgado, supra note 12.
175. Id.
176. Id.; Lawrence, supra note 7.
177. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
181. Id. at 321.
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speech .... 11812 The very injury sought to be prevented is the direct
impact of speech upon the listener.
Campus hate speech codes aimed at protecting students from psy-
chological injury do not meet the content-neutral requirement of the
secondary effects doctrine, because each is aimed at curbing the emo-
tive impact of speech upon its listener. Even when a definitive and
recognized harm may injure a specific group, the First Amendment
prohibits viewpoint-based speech proscriptions.' 3 To combat the po-
tential harm of hate speech, the best course of action is not to stifle
speech but to add more speech to the marketplace.'84 Counterspeech is
the most powerful instrument available for gaining equality and curb-
ing the secondary effects of offensive speech.,85 Only by pointing out
the weaknesses and the moral wrongness of an oppressor's speech can
an oppressed group realize the strength of advocating a morally just
outcome. The use of counter speech is consistent with the Constitu-
tion and the foundation of a free society. It is only through speech
and counter speech that a democratic society functions and just laws
are enacted.
3. Speech, Women, and Viewpoint Discrimination
In an analogous case, American Booksellers Association, Inc. v.
Hudnut,'86 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck an In-
dianapolis ordinance because it was content and viewpoint restrictive.
While Hudnut predated Renton and the secondary effects doctrine by
several months, proponents of the Indianapolis ordinance at issue in
Hudnut made arguments similar to the secondary effects doctrine. In
Hudnut, American Booksellers Association, Inc. challenged an ordi-
nance defining and prohibiting pornography which discriminates
against women.'87 Specifically, the ordinance prohibited the "graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in
words" displaying women in various scenarios and stereotyped
roles."'88 Indianapolis prohibited such depictions of women in any kind
of work, be it of "literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'" 8 9
182. Id.
183. For example, in R.A. V. black Minnesota citizens were subjected to a crudely con-
structed burning cross. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). Despite the harm experienced by those indivi-
duals, the R.A. V. Court determined that the City of St. Paul ordinance prohibiting such acts
violated the First Amendment. Id.
184. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989).
185. Id.
186. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 324 (citation omitted).
189. Id. at 325.
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Arguing in favor of the ordinance, civil rights groups and feminists
claimed that it would play an important role in "reducing the ten-
dency of men to view women as sexual objects, a tendency that leads
to both unacceptable attitudes and discrimination in the workplace
and violence away from it."'9 Because pornography influenced atti-
tudes, the ordinance was "a way to alter the socialization of men and
women rather than ...vindicate community standards of offensive-
ness." 1 9' As one prominent supporter of the ordinance put it: "[I]f a
woman is subjected, why should it matter that the work has other
value?"' 92 In effect, supporters were arguing for a secondary effects
exception similar to pleas made by proponents of campus hate speech
codes.
The Seventh Circuit found that the statute was unconstitutional,' 93
and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision without com-
ment.' 94 The Seventh Circuit found the ordinance's definition of por-
nography violative of the First Amendment because it established "an
'approved' view of women . . . . Those who espouse the approved
view may use sexual images; those who do not, may not."'' 9 Even in
recognizing the dangers inherent in pornography, the court observed
that pornography perpetuates a belief system that, whether right or
wrong, is protected speech under the First Amendment.' 96 The social
forces of racism, anti-Semitism, and violence all shape an individual's
socialization and perceptions. 197 Hateful speech must be protected by
the First Amendment, otherwise the government would be "in control
of all of the institutions of culture, the great censor and director of
which thoughts are-good for us."' 98
Proponents of the ordinance argued that pornography as speech is
unanswerable and is not speech at all because it does not contribute to
the search for truth.' 99 In response, the court found that the domi-
nance of truth is not a "necessary condition of freedom of speech." °
Limiting speech on the basis that otherwise the truth will not prevail
"implies the power to declare the truth." 20 1
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1985)).
193. Id.
194. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
195. 771 F.2d at 327.
196. Id. at 328.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 329.
199. Id. at 330.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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The Indianapolis ordinance restricted not only the content of speech
(e.g., prohibiting all pornography of women in general), but further
prohibited particular views on the roles of women (e.g., women in
subordinate positions). 20 2 Only pornography depicting women as "ob-
jects" or in "subordinate" roles was prohibited.2 3 Depictions of
women in domineering roles or roles of power, however, would be
permitted. 204 The Seventh Circuit found that such selective restriction
of speech was viewpoint discrimination and amounted to nothing
more than "thought control." 5
Likewise, proponents of campus hate speech codes have envisioned
a favored view of society free of bigotry, sexism and hate. By using
universities as a vehicle for the indoctrination of predetermined social
mores, hate speech code advocates hope to "enlighten" those in the
dark on such issues. Speech code proponents seek to determine the
"truth" to be sought through discourse, thereby achieving social he-
gemony by restricting the search for truth to only approved view-
points. As Judge Easterbrook stated: "If the government may declare
the truth, why wait for the failure of speech? ' '206 The purpose of the
First Amendment is to prevent the oppression of Americans and the
spread of "dogma that may enslave others. ' 207 For this reason, hate
speech codes are in conflict with the First Amendment.
4. Narrowly Tailored
When the First Amendment conflicts with the Equal Protection
Clause, statutes implicating both must "be narrowly tailored to their
legitimate objectives. ' 20 8 The First Amendment requires that govern-
ment be specific and precise in its regulation when attempting to
achieve the goals of the Equal Protection Clause.2°9 Accordingly, the
government may not "vindicate its interest in preventing disruption by
the wholesale exclusion of [speech] on all but [a few] preferred sub-
ject[s] ''210
By its nature, a hate speech code regulates only speech that conveys
messages of "hate." The problem with such specific regulation is that
the Equal Protection Clause requires precisely the equal protection of
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 328.
206. Id. at 331.
207. Id. at 328.
208. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (citation omitted).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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all individuals and the messages they convey. The goal of outsider ju-
risprudence advocates, and others supporting hate speech codes, is the
unequal protection of speech."' Fundamental to the functioning of a
free society and the education of youth is the First Amendment belief
that "if there is any principle of the Constitution that more impera-
tively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free
thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought that we hate. ' 21 2 Speech codes must be narrowly tai-
lored to meet a compelling government interest. Otherwise, such codes
run the risk of sweeping too broadly and chilling protected speech.
The next Part analyzes campus hate speech codes under the First
Amendment doctrines of "overbreadth" and "vagueness."
V. OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS
Although few courts have applied the R.A. V. analysis to campus
hate speech codes, the principles set forth in Justice White's concur-
ring opinion has provided the strongest basis to date for striking such
codes. Justice White's concurrence in R.A. V. emphasized that the St.
Paul ordinance swept too broadly in attempting to regulate unpro-
tected speech." 3 The following section examines the overbreadth doc-
trine in the context of the St. Paul ordinance and campus hate speech
codes.
A. Facial Overbreadth: Fertile Ground for Statute Striking
The overbreadth doctrine allows a person being prosecuted for ex-
pressive conduct to bring a facial challenge to a statute that reaches
protected conduct "even when that person's activities are not pro-
tected by the First Amendment. ' ' 21 4 Fundamental to the overbreadth
doctrine is the belief that all "harm to society in permitting some un-
protected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that protected speech of others may be muted .... ,11 It is important
to note, however, that using the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medi-
cine," appropriate only when the overbreadth is both real and sub-
stantial "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
211. Matsuda, supra note 7.
212. U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added), rev'd, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
213. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2558 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
214. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2558; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
215. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
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sweep. ' ' 216 But such application is nonetheless necessary to preserve
our most precious liberties when they are threatened by a hostile ma-
jority.
The R.A.V. concurrence considered the St. Paul ordinance based
on the limiting construction of the Minnesota Supreme Court, 2 7
which purported to restrict the ordinance's reach to only those catego-
ries of speech not protected by the First Amendment.2 8 However, the
concurring Justices determined that the ordinance "also criminalizes a
substantial amount of expression that-however repugnant-is
shielded by the First Amendment. 2
9
A fatal flaw of the St. Paul ordinance lies in the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's interpretation of fighting words. 2 0 The Minnesota
court used the Chaplinsky definition of fighting words-"those which
by their very utterance inflict injury . "..."2" The court's interpreta-
tion of "injury," however, included "those displays that one knows
or should know will create anger, alarm or resentment based on ra-
cial, ethnic, gender or religious bias." 2 2 That is, Minnesota construed
the ordinance to prohibit words that by their very utterance, cause
"anger, alarm or resentment. ' 2 3 The First Amendment, however,
may not be evaded so easily. 2 4
The fighting words cases make it clear that a listener's generalized
reaction to offensive words is not enough to "strip expression of its
constitutional protection. The mere fact that expressive activity causes
hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression
unprotected." ' 22' Rather, the First Amendment explicitly protects
"everyday" speech, even "insulting" speech, despite its emotive im-
pact on listeners.226 In fact, the fundamental underpinnings of the
First Amendment require that the most offensive speech be pro-
tected-even when that speech is rooted in hatred. "[U]tterances hon-
estly believed contribute to the free exchange of ideas and the
ascertainment of truth. '2
7
216. Id. at 615.
217. R.A.V., 112S. Ct. at2559.
218. Id. (The Minnesota Supreme Court limited the ordinance to fighting words. In re Wel-
fare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
222. RA. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (quoting In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W. 2d at 510).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2548.
225. Id.
226. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24
(1971); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
227. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). See also U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
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In general, hate speech codes attempt to "cleanse public debate to
the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish
among us. ''228 By stifling the marketplace of ideas, proponents of hate
speech codes attempt to create a fictional "equality" in which the op-
pressed minority becomes the ruling majority. The new majority's
equality, however, comes from the heavy hand of regulation instead
of through the pervasive and empowering force of counter speech.2 29
Our society is protected from such an Orwellian future because of
"our absolute right to propagate opinions that the government finds
wrong or even hateful." 230
As two recent decisions demonstrate, the overbreadth doctrine pro-
vides the most fertile ground for courts on which to strike university
hate speech codes.
B. Doe v. University of Michigan23 '
As the seminal case in the campus hate speech code controversy,
Doe represents the first student challenge to a speech code in federal
court. Doe was a graduate student at the University of Michigan stud-
ying biopsychology-an interdisciplinary study of the biological basis
for personality traits and mental abilities.23 2 Doe's research involved
the examination of certain controversial theories which suggested bio-
logical differences between races and sexes.2 33 Because such theories
might be labeled "sexist" or "racist," Doe refrained from openly dis-
cussing these theories out of fear of sanctions under the university
speech code. 23 4 Claiming that his right to openly discuss such theories
was impermissibly chilled, Doe sought to have the speech code de-
clared unconstitutional on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. 235
The Michigan hate speech code, described in Part II supra of this
Comment, was enacted by university administrators in response to a
rise in incidents of racial harassment and the threat of civil rights
(1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Terminiello, 337 U.S. 1.
228. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
229. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
230. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
231. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
232. 721 F. Supp. at 858.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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suits.236 Even after recognizing the serious threat posed to the First
Amendment, the acting president justified the speech code, stating
that "speaking or writing discriminatory remarks which seriously of-
fend many individuals . . .detract[s] from the necessary educational
climate of a campus .... 37
The Michigan speech code applied differently depending upon the
context.238 In public areas, a higher degree of tolerance for speech was
available and sanctions were imposed only in cases of violence.239 Stu-
dent living areas were also apparently covered by the code.2"4 The
most troublesome aspect of the code, however, was its reach into
"[e]ducational and academic centers, such as classroom buildings, li-
braries, research laboratories, recreation and study centers." 24 It is in
this context that the federal district court found the code to sweep
within its ambit speech protected by the First Amendment. 242
Relying on the doctrinal framework of overbreadth, the district
court found that these First Amendment principles "acquire a special
significance in the university setting, where the free and unfettered in-
terplay of competing views is essential to the institution's educational
mission. 2 43 Even in the special circumstances of the university, the
district court cited several examples illustrating that the code was con-
sistently applied to reach protected speech. 244 First, a graduate student
in social work was charged with harassment based on sexual orienta-
tion and sex because he stated his belief, in the classroom, that "ho-
mosexuality was a disease and that he intended to develop a
counseling plan for changing gay clients to straight."2 '5 Second, a
business student was charged with harassment based on sexual orien-
tation because he read a "homophobic" limerick during a public-
speaking exercise which ridiculed a well-known athlete for his sexual
orientation.2" Third, the professor of a preclinical dentistry class filed
a complaint against a student who stated that he heard "that minori-
ties had a difficult time in the course and that . . . they were not
236. Id. The university also feared the loss of federal funding.
237. Id. at 855.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 856.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 863 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 865.
246. Id.
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treated fairly. 2 47 The statement was apparently made in the context
of a small group formed specifically to discuss anticipated problems in
the class.241 In a fourth incident, charges were filed, and later dis-
missed, against a student who offended another student in a class on
the Holocaust by suggesting that Jews used the Holocaust to justify
Israel's policies toward Palestine.2 49
In each of these instances, the district court determined that the stu-
dent's speech fell within the boundaries of the First Amendment. 50
Yet in each case, university officials held the subtle threat of sanctions
over each student-a manner of enforcement deemed to be the equiv-
alent of "a full blown prosecution. ' 251 For these reasons, the code
was overbroad both on its face and as applied.252
The Doe court also found the code to be void for vagueness because
students of ordinary "intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing. ' 253 To comply with the First Amendment, a statute must provide
adequate warning as to what conduct is permitted and prohibited.2 54
Statutes must also provide guidelines for application to avoid arbi-
trary intrusions on civil liberties. 5  These requirements "apply with
particular force where the challenged statute acts to inhibit freedoms
affirmatively protected by the constitution."25 6
The Michigan speech code was void for vagueness because it was
impossible for a student to "discern any limitation on its scope or any
conceptual distinction between protected and unprotected con-
duct. "257 Particularly troublesome to the court were words such as
"victimize" and "stigmatize"-words that necessarily require a sub-
jective interpretation of cause and effect.2 58 The university failed to
provide students with a mechanism for distinguishing between pro-
tected and unprotected conduct, leaving students to guess about the
effect of each comment made. 259 Even counsel for the university ac-
knowledged that the only way a student could make such a determina-
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 865 n.14.
250. 721 F. Supp. 852.
251. Id. at 866.
252. Id.
253. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973)).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (citation omitted).
257. Id. at 867.
258. Id. "These words can only be understood with reference to some exogenous value sys-
tem." Id. at 859.
259. Id. at 867.
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tion would be "very carefully. ' '260 Such vague enforcement terms
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26 1
Therefore, the Michigan code was unconstitutional.
C. UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin162
Two years after Doe, the Eastern District of Wisconsin struck a
similar university speech code not only on overbreadth and vagueness
grounds, but also because the code's definition of fighting words vio-
lated the First Amendment. 63 The University of Wisconsin code was
enacted to discourage discrimination and harassment and encourage
diversity on the University's twenty-six campuses. 26 The code was de-
signed with the assistance of law professors who assured the university
that the code would withstand First Amendment scrutiny, because its
application required that a speaker intend to create a hostile educa-
tional environment for the individuals addressed.2 65
When the code was in effect, nine students were sanctioned: one for
calling another student "shakazulu." 26 Another student violated the
code by shouting loud epithets at a woman for ten minutes. 2 7 Still
another student was disciplined for yelling at an Asian-American stu-
dent, "It's people like you-that's the reason this country is screwed
up. '" 268 A student was sanctioned for harassing a Turkish-American
student by impersonating an immigration official and requesting im-
migration documents.26 9 One student called a residence hall staff
member a "piece of shit nigger," and another a "South American
immigrant."2 70 A student was sanctioned for placing a message stating
"Death to all Arabs!! Die Islamic scumbags!" on a computer screen
sent to an Iranian faculty member.2' Other students were disciplined
for calling a fellow student a "fat ass nigger" and yelling to a female
student in public "you've got nice tits.'271
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1164.
265. Id. at 1165. Part 11 of this Comment outlines the provisions of the Wisconsin speech
code.
266. Id. at 1167.
267. Id. The student repeatedly shouted "fucking bitch" and "fucking cunt" at the woman
in response to statements she made about the university's athletic department. Id.
268. Id. The student also told the Asian-American student "you don't belong here" and
"Whites are always getting screwed by minorities and some day the Whites will take over." Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1168.
272. Id.
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A group of students sued the university claiming that the code was
overbroad and void for vagueness. 273 While the Eastern District Court
of Wisconsin struck the code on these grounds, the court went on to
respond to the university's argument that the code only proscribed
fighting words within the permissible bounds of the First Amend-
ment. 27 4 The court's analysis of fighting words in this context is signif-
icant because it serves as a logical precursor to the Supreme Court's
decision in R.A. V. one year later.
The district court initially explained the limited definition given to
fighting words by the Supreme Court." 5 This definition included
words that: (1) inflict injury by their very utterance; (2) "naturally
tend to provoke violent resentment"; 276 and (3) are "directed at the
person of the hearer. ' 277 Words that cause any reaction less than an
immediate breach of the peace cannot be punished as fighting words
under the First Amendment.2 78
Applying this definition of fighting words to the Wisconsin speech
code, the court broke the code down to four elements. For the code to
apply, the speech must: (1) be "racist or discriminatory"; (2) be "di-
rected at an individual"; (3) be demeaning to the "race, sex, religion,
etc."; and (4) "create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning [educa-
tional] environment. "27 9 The court seemed to focus on the reason
"fighting" words are characterized as such. If speech induces an im-
mediate violent reaction, it is proscribable under the First Amend-
ment. A reaction short of violence, however, does not justify this kind
of content-based proscription. Therefore, because the Wisconsin code
does not require that the speech, by its very utterance, tend to incite
violent reaction, it goes beyond the narrow scope of the fighting
words definition and is unconstitutional. 8 0
The first element, requiring that speech be racist or discriminatory,
targets speech based on its content and not on the reaction it is likely
to invoke.2 1 While the second element appears at first glance to meet
First Amendment requirements, it does not require that the prohibited
speech always incite violent reaction, and may therefore apply in a
273. Id.
274. ld. at 1169.
275. Id. at 1170 (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1171 (citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978)).
279. Id. at 1172.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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variety of instances-violent or not. '82 Third, speech may demean a
person on the basis of race, gender, religion, etc., without inciting a
riot.283 Finally, although a hostile educational environment may be
disturbing, "it does not necessarily tend to incite violent reaction."
284
Based on this analysis, the district court found the speech code over-
broad and therefore in violation of the First Amendment.
2 85
Significantly, the district court rejected the university's argument
that a balancing approach should be employed to regulate speech that
has only slight social value and harmful effects. 26 A balancing ap-
proach is appropriate only where the regulation is content neutral.
287
The Wisconsin speech code regulates speech not only based on its con-
tent, but also on its viewpoint. Speech which does not ridicule a per-
son's race, sex, religion, etc., is permitted, while speech that ridicules
on these bases is prohibited. "This is thought control." 28 The district
court's analysis closely resembles R.A. V.'s majority holding by focus-
ing on the scope of fighting words and the inherently broad nature of
a definition which prohibits any word tending to evoke any kind of
reaction.
In examining the doctrinal underpinnings of free speech and cam-
pus hate speech codes, one may question whether these broad princi-
ples should apply differently in the special situation of American
universities. Because undergraduate and graduate education forces
students to challenge existing thoughts and ideas, there is a tremen-
dous opportunity for students and teachers alike to educate one an-
other through the free and open exchange of ideas. It is through
speech that an individual attains the education and reasoning skills
necessary to achieve equality. For it is that by understanding what is,
and the arguments of those one disagrees with, that an individual may
determine what ought to be. Free speech and reason are the empower-
ing devices every individual must possess to create social change and
achieve equality.
When arguments for hate speech codes fail on constitutional
grounds, advocates look to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
for support.289 The Title VII argument claims that the free and open
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1173.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1174 (citing American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)).
288. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328.
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991).
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debate of ideas creates a hostile learning environment for students of
oppressed groups in violation of federal law. The regulation of speech
in the workplace, however, differs significantly from the regulation of
speech in the university setting. The doctrine of academic freedom will
not allow speech codes, either explicit or implicit, to jeopardize the
mission and role of education in American society.
VI. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Just beyond the realm of First Amendment law lies the doctrine of
academic freedom. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court defined the
contours of this doctrine, ensuring that content-based, overbroad and
vague limits on speech serve as a floor, rather than a ceiling, on the
breadth of a student's First Amendment freedoms. The following ex-
amines this doctrine in light of campus hate speech codes and a recent
order by the U.S. District Court for New Hampshire. 290
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized "the essenti-
ality of freedom in the community of American universities [as] al-
most self-evident. "191 The university plays a vital role in educating and
training this country's youth, 292 and "[tihe vigilant protection of [our]
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools." 2 93 Free and open discussion of ideas is essential
to American education because "[sicholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. ' 294 The Court has repeatedly
held that "[ojur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us . . . That free-
dom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the class-
room."2 95 More than any other forum, "[tihe classroom is peculiarly
the 'marketplace of ideas." 296
Students and teachers do not leave their constitutional freedoms "at
the schoolhouse gate. ' 297 The notion of academic freedom rests on a
290. Silva v. University of New Hampshire, 1994 WL 504417 (D.N.H. 1994).
291. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). See generally West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating a statute requiring recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in schools).
292. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 ("[A]ny straight jacket" imposed on educators "would imperil
the future of our Nation.")
293. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); see also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 165 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of
teachers ... has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers
ought especially to cultivate and practice.").
294. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
295. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
296. Id.
297. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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foundation of national strength made up of the kind of "hazardous
freedom," openness, and "independence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this ... society. '291 Even when a school fears an
act of expression will cause a disturbance, that fear is not enough to
overcome fundamental freedoms. 99 For this reason, state schools
"may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.' 30 0
Even in the face of these broad goals, academic freedom recognizes
the need for order in the "special characteristics of the school envi-
ronment."3 " In this regard, schools have "comprehensive authority
. . . consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools. ' 302 In Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier,30 the Court recognized a school's ability to
limit speech related to a "valid educational purpose.''3° In Kuhl-
meier, a high school was allowed to censor a student newspaper of
selected articles since the paper was considered part of the curriculum
for a journalism class.30 5 When speech is part of "legitimate academic
decisionmaking," the school may limit student and teacher speech.
3 0
However, when schools attempt to regulate private student speech un-
related to an educational purpose, .the First Amendment is "directly
and sharply implicated ' 30 7 and will require "judicial intervention to
protect students' constitutional rights.' '308
A. Whether Classroom Speech Is Protected
A school may censor student speech only when the censorship has a
valid educational purpose such as maintaining order in school.2 9
298. Id. at 508-09.
299. Id. at 508
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from
the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom,
or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argu-
ment or disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk ....
Id.
300. Id. at 511. "In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of
only that which the State chooses to communicate." Id. Otherwise, the freedom "would not
truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has pro-
vided as a safe haven for crackpots." Id. at 513.
301. Id. at 506.
302. Id. at 507.
303. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
304. Id. at 273.
305. Id. at 260-61.
306. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 183 (1990).
307. Kuhlineier, 484 U.S. at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted).
308. Id.
309. Id.
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The need for order and censorship, however, will not match the
force First Amendment protections should command on college cam-
puses.3"" In fact, a university may not shut off the dissemination of
ideas-"no matter how offensive to good taste"- in the name of
"conventions of decency" alone."' The Supreme Court has expressly
overruled the use of school authority to regulate speech when students
are sanctioned based on the content of the message.1 12 "[T]he First
Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in
the academic community with respect to the content of speech
.. "33 Campus hate speech codes target private student speech
which cannot be censored under the First Amendment absent a clear
educational motive.
In Silva v. University of New Hampshire,1 4 the U.S. District Court
for New Hampshire clarified the standard applied in cases challenging
the First Amendment on academic freedom grounds. In Silva, a pro-
fessor was charged with violation of the university's sexual harass-
ment policy for using sexually suggestive speech in a technical writing
class as an instrument of instruction." Specifically, Professor Silva
recited two analogies that he had used in previous semesters, before
1992, to convey certain ideas about technical writing.1 6 First, the pro-
fessor described the "focus" necessary for good technical writing in
terms of sex: "Focus is like sex. You seek a target. You zero in on
your subject. You move from side to side. You close in on the subject.
You bracket the subject and center on it. Focus connects experience
and language. You and the subject become one.131 7 In a second tech-
nical writing class, Professor Silva employed "Little Egypt's defini-
tion of belly dancing" to provide an example of a good definition that
employs general classifications, such as belly dancing, with a concrete
310. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
311. Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). See also University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990) (affirming the
academic freedom doctrine when the state places content-based restrictions on student and
teacher speech). But see Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534 (1lth Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the
academic freedom doctrine does not apply with full force in certain university contexts).
312. Papish, 410 U.S. at 670.
313. Id. at 671. But see Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972) (discussing the limited
circumstances in which a professor's speech may be legitimately curtailed), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
972 (1973).
314. 1994 WL 504417 (D.N.H. 1994).
315. Id. The University of New Hampshire sexual harassment policy is outlined in Part 11 of
this Comment.
316. Id. at *2-3. Silva later stated that he "used both examples in . . . classes on numerous
prior occasions without incident, land] the Little Egypt simile since the early 1970's. [He] consid-
ered both illustrations to have legitimate pedagogical goals." Id.
317. Id. at *3.
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metaphor, "like jello shimmying on a plate" with a vibrator under it,
so that students of belly dancing better understand the necessary
movements of the dance.3"8 Professor Silva described this metaphor as
a legitimate pedagogical instrument because it "is classic in its use of
concrete differentia and simple metaphor, i.e. the trembling jello
equates to the essential movements necessary to the dance. It is unlike
the dance but also its very essence." 31 9
The U.S. District Court for New Hampshire upheld Professor Sil-
va's First Amendment claim on academic freedom grounds. 20 The
court applied the test set forth in Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle32 to prove a violation of the First
Amendment. Under the Mount Healthy analysis, the plaintiff must
show (1) the classroom speech was constitutionally protected and (2)
the speech was a motivating factor in the decision to discipline him. 22
The defendant then "must show that it would have acted in the same
manner even in the absence of the protected classroom speech. ' 323
The university disciplined Professor Silva because of his classroom
comments. 24 The second element of this test is met and, therefore, the
only question that remains is whether Professor Silva's speech is pro-
tected.
The first inquiry in this regard is whether the teacher was put on
notice of what conduct and speech is prohibited.3 25 Without notice, a
teacher may not know to avoid the conduct and speech prohibited to
save his position. 2 6 In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 27 the Supreme
Court required that schools give clear direction to teachers as to what
speech and conduct is prohibited. 321 Without narrow and specific re-
gulations, a teacher must guess as to what speech and conduct might
"lose him his position, [and he] will 'steer far wider of the unlawful
zone . . ,,,129 Thus, without adequate notice of prohibited speech,
classroom instruction and discourse would be chilled out of fear of
318. Id. (Silva specifically stated to his class, "Belly dancing is like jello on a plate with a
vibrator under the plate.").
319. Id.
320. Id. at *21.
321. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
322. 1994 WL 504417 at *19.
323. Id.
324. Id. at *23 ("but for Silva's classroom statements he would not have been subject to
UNH discipline").
325. Id. at *19 (citing Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993)); see also Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
326. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
327. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
328. 1994 WL 504417 at *19 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604).
329. id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 860 (1958)).
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sanctions. Chilled classroom speech sacrifices the quality of an educa-
tion that trains students to think independently for the sake of stu-
dents who have been indoctrinated with a "politically correct"
mindset.330 The relevant question to be addressed is whether in light of
the "existing regulations, policies, discussions, and other forms of
communication between school administration and teachers, was it
reasonable for the school to expect . . the teacher to know that [his]
conduct was prohibited?" 331
The Silva court determined that the communication in question was
not "of a sexual nature" under the University sexual harassment pol-
icy; rather, the six complainants mistakenly understood the message
as sexual.33 2 It is the complainants' misunderstanding of the message
which created an offensive academic environment.333 For this reason,
the university's discipline of Professor Silva violated the notice re-
quirement of Keyishian .14
The second inquiry in determining whether the professor's speech is
protected requires "that the government regulation be reasonably re-
lated to legitimate pedagogical concerns." '335 In Mailloux v. Kiley,3 36
the First Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the test for determining
the validity of a government regulation affecting a teacher's classroom
speech ."
[F]ree speech does not grant teachers a license to say or write in class
whatever they may feel like, and ... the propriety of regulations or
sanctions must depend on such circumstances as the age and
sophistication of the students, the closeness of the relation between
330. Politically correct speech is a general limitation on any kind of speech that excludes a
class or individual based on particular characteristics. One commentator explained politically
correct speech as any speech that "implies that those who are not heterosexual, caucasian, and
male with 'Eurocentric' thought patterns are somehow 'less' than those who possess these attrib-
utes." Alexander, supra note 7, at 1372. Where classroom speech is restricted to politically cor-
rect speech, no one benefits. Teachers and students wishing to express ideas are stifled by the
threat of sanctions and therefore sacrifice educational goals, while students who might be of-
fended are never given an opportunity to develop reasoning skills because there is no idea or
speech to counter.
331. 1994 WL 504417 at *19.
332. id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. id. at *20 (citing Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452-53 (1st Cir. 1993)); see also Hazel-
wood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) ("educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns"); Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971)).
336. Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
337. Id.
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the specific technique used and some concededly valid educational
objective, and the context and manner of presentation. 3 8
The court held that the university's sexual harassment policy, as ap-
plied to classroom speech, "seeks to address the legitimate pedagogi-
cal concern of providing a congenial academic environment."339
Applying the Mailloux test to the situation in Silva, the complaining
students were all adult college students and were presumed to possess
the sophistication of adults. 340 Professor Silva's teaching objective in
conveying basic writing principles to his class was advanced by his
classroom statements.3 4' Finally, because the statements were made in
the context of his college class lecture, the third requirement regarding
the manner of presentation was satisfied.3 42 An analysis of this inquiry
in light of First Amendment interests in academic freedom, prompted
the Silva court to determine that the university's sexual harassment
policy was "not reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical pur-
pose of providing a congenial academic environment because it em-
ploy[ed] an impermissibly subjective standard that fails to take into
account the nation's interest in academic freedom." 343 For this reason,
application of this policy to Professor Silva violated the First Amend-
ment. 344
B. Is the Protection of Some Worth the Education of Others?
The University of New Hampshire's use of a sexual harassment pol-
icy similar to Title VII to regulate speech runs counter to the primary
mission of a university to educate students through open discourse
and debate. The university setting is fundamentally different from the
workplace, and the purpose of Title VII is inconsistent with the mis-
sion of a university. In the workplace, employee speech is generally
limited to that speech which is necessary to complete a job or task.
Though some employees engage in social speech with co-workers,
most speech in the workplace tends to be that which is necessary to
meet the goals of the business.
The university setting, on the other hand, is different because the
goal and mission of education is different. Whereas the goal of work-
place speech is business profit, the bottom line in education is the de-
338. Id. at 1243.
339. Id.
340. 1994 WL 504417 (D.N.H. 1994).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at *21.
344. Id.
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velopment of reasoning, analysis and independent thinking. A
university may fulfill its mission by developing these skills, challeng-
ing preconceived notions and the existing set of social and political
mores. Students learn substantive material through the discussion and
analysis of their own prejudices and ideas.
Free speech is fundamental to the functioning of a free society. The
First Amendment protection of free speech forms the basis upon
which Americans participate in government and achieve social change.
Words, thoughts, prayers and votes are mechanisms by which a free
society creates laws and protects its citizens. There is less opportunity
for tyranny by the majority in a society that allows for the open de-
bate of ideas by all its citizens. Just solutions to social problems can
be achieved through speech and counter speech.3 45
The majority opinion in R.A. V. strikes at the heart of a free soci-
ety. Without the preservation of First Amendment rights in cases that
offend us the most, there is no need for a First Amendment because
speech in cases that do not offend us is not in need of protection.
Democracy is built upon the voice and will of the people. The primary
responsibility of American citizenship is to make one's voice heard
through voting and participation in the government.
Higher education is the one place in America where one's primary
purpose is not only to make one's voice heard, but also to question
one's ideas and the ideas of others. The university's fundamental mis-
sion is "to search for truth and a university is a place where people
have to have the right to speak the unspeakable and think the un-
thinkable and challenge the unchallengeable." 3" Students entering
universities should be prepared to confront ideas that they do not like.
In the case of law schools, the study of law requires that every student
learn and be able to articulate all sides of an argument-even those
views they disagree with. Legal education requires that students con-
front arguments and ideas that they do not like. At the heart of
R.A. V. is the notion that a university cannot selectively ban certain
ideas from the educational environment because the ideas may harm
individuals who, by the act of enrolling in a university, ask for the
development of their minds through debate and discourse.
345. The counter speech of activists such as Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, William E. B.
Du Bois and Frederick Douglass achieved social change for the plight of minorities despite an
institutional imbalance of resources. Hentoff, supra note 11, at 183. The counter speech of pri-
vate citizens is the most productive means of addressing offensive speech. Otherwise, in the
words of Theodore Roosevelt "the one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of
preventing all possibility of its continuing to be a nation at all .. .would be to permit it to
become a tangle of squabbling nationalities." CLEARY, supra note 1, at 71 (citing Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. quoting Theodore Roosevelt).
346. Hentoff, supra note 11, at 152 (quoting Benno Schmidt, President of Yale University).
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Students who enter an undergraduate or graduate education pro-
gram bring with them their fears, doubts, misconceptions, and
strongly held beliefs. "If they spend four years cooped up under re-
pressive regulations, they might well dutifully obey the rules, offend
no one, and leave with all their prejudices, fears, doubts, and miscon-
ceptions firmly intact. '3 47 Campus hate speech codes teach individuals
to think of government and authority with Orwellian fear. 48 The edu-
cation of people requires the free disclosure and challenge of basic
social and political values. Speech codes prevent the full development
of an individual's mind by limiting the ideas that may be publicly con-
sidered and analyzed.
The implementation of speech codes on university campuses sends
this message to bigots:
We can't cope with your disgusting speech. Your words are too
powerful for us administrators and faculty. We don't know how to
educate against it. So, in this place of higher learning and free
inquiry, we're going to shut you up. We are too weak in resources,
skills, creativity and courage to do anything else.349
The intuitive fallacy of campus speech codes is that they "weaken
those they ostensibly protect by not enabling them to protect them-
selves." 350 One must wonder how giving offensive power to some can
possibly improve the lot of the oppressed .31 Speech codes do not hurt
bigots; rather, those most hurt by "the pall of orthodoxy on campus
are students who are liberals but of an independent mind-and mod-
erates. 3 12 Ironically, universities have attempted to improve speech
through speech codes. However, the only way to improve speech "is
to abolish all speech codes. Not 'improve.' Abolish. 353
The lofty goals of speech code advocates are not inconsistent with
the First Amendment. Rather, it is the means by which this group at-
tempts to achieve the ends of social equality that conflict with individ-
ual liberties. Speech-code advocates are not without recourse because
347. Id. at 169.
348. Students are afraid to speak out on the views they hold. At the University of California
at Berkeley, home of the Free Speech Movement, a student looked nervously over her shoulder
and asked that her name not be used, noting "It]here are things you wouldn't want to talk about
around certain people." Hentoff, supra note 11, at 153 (citing Louis Freedberg, A Campus Fear
of Speaking Freely, SAN FRANcIsco CHRON., Oct. 30, 1991, at Al).
349. Id. at 177.
350. Id. at 196.
351. Id. at 177.
352. Id. at 152-53.
353. Id. at 196.
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the First Amendment provides a strong shield against the sword of
offensive speech: counter speech. Through the active, engaging, and
often relentless debate on issues of social and political concern, hold-
ers of minority opinions learn the strengths of their own arguments
and the weaknesses of their opponents'. With this knowledge, these
groups are better able to strike at the heart of a bigoted argument with
all of the fervor and force necessary to combat hateful ideas. Instead
of sacrificing the most fundamental of our civil liberties for the sake
of the Fourteenth Amendment, we must use the liberty as a force for
social change. 114
VII. CONCLUSION
The controversy over hate speech codes boils down to a conflict be-
tween the advocates of civil rights and the advocates of civil liber-
ties." ' The goal of both groups is to improve the functioning of a free
society by ensuring that every citizen is equipped with the same oppor-
tunities for growth and achievement, and is given the opportunity to
live a life free from the fear of fellow citizens. Each group aims to
increase citizen participation in government, professional and social
life. To achieve this end, each group takes a separate and conflicting
route. The paths of each, however, can run in harmony when the First
Amendment is used both as a shield and as a sword. It is only when
the citizens of a free society use the force of words, thoughts, and
votes, that true social change occurs. Civil rights have, thus far, been
recognized because of this country's dedication to an individual's civil
liberties. Deviation from this commitment may result in a society
composed of individuals lacking the skill or educational background
to challenge governmental authority and improve the functioning of a
free society.
354. As an example, Malcolm X proved to be "an extraordinarily resilient, resourceful,
probing master of language." He did not achieve this skill, however, by being protected from
racist speech. Hentoff, supra note 11, at 167.
355. Id. at 150.
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